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LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING IN LONDON AND IN
WASHINGTON

*

DIcERSON

1

REED

TE meetings of the American Bar Association held in London in
1957 furnished an incidental but valuable opportunity to inquire
into the methods of English legislative draftsmanship and to make
some useful comparisons with its counterpart in Washington.
The first striking fact that emerges in such a comparison is that
almost all the public laws enacted by Parliament are drafted by one
small group of men, the expert draftsmen of the Office of the
Parliamentary Counsel. 2 This is in sharp contrast to the situation
in Washington, where legislation is prepared by the Offices of the
Legislative Counsel of the House and Senate, by members of the
professional staffs of the many standing and special committees of
Congress, by the legal staffs of the executive departments and
agencies, and even by members of the public. 3 Since this aggregate
is very large, the question immediately arises: Why so few and so
concentrated in London and why so many and so dispersed in
Washington?
One obvious explanation would seem to be that the greater size
and complexity of the United States must inevitably result in a
larger number of, and more difficult, legislative problems, too large
for any single drafting group to handle. But even a cursory
examination of the recent statute books shows a physical volume
of English public laws quite comparable to that appearing during
the same period in the Federal Statutes at Large. Indeed, there
is some reason to believe that Parliament's ultimate legislative
responsibility may even be greater than that of Congress, since it
includes matters that in the United States would be the subject of
state control or otherwise circumscribed by the Constitution. But
whatever the exact ratio may be, it hardly parallels that formed
by the respective numbers of participating draftsmen.
• This article has already appeared in the American Bar Association Journal,
1958, and is here republished with consent.
1 Professor

of Law at Indiana

University School of Law;

author of Legal

Drafting (1954); formerly of the Office of General Counsel, Department of
Defense, U.S.A.
2 Exceptions: Consolidated Fund Bills; Statute Law Revision Bills; Bills
extending exclusively to Scotland; Private Members' Bills.
3 Members of Congress sometimes draft legislation, but for the most part they
cannot take the time.
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Another, and more satisfactory, explanation is that the British
draftsmen in the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel are permitted
to make an enormously more efficient use of their time than the
draftsmen of American Federal legislation. This is rooted for the
most part in the much tighter control of the Government 4 over the
legislative programme. With the legislative and executive branches
fused in the persons of the cabinet ministers, who are also members
of Parliament, and with the Government in strict control of the use
of parliamentary time, the chances of the legislature's failure to
support the Government's programme is much less in England than
it is in the United States. (Failure to support the programme
would bring down the Government.) This control is enhanced by
a more effective integration of policy decisions and a significantly
tighter party discipline. The result is that once the Government
decides to push a legislative measure its ultimate enactment becomes
almost a certainty. It is rare for the Government to have to
abandon a bill. Conversely, a bill sponsored by an individual
member of Parliament has a relatively small chance of success. In
Washington, on the other hand, all bills are individually sponsored
in form and a large proportion of them are individually sponsored
in substance.
Since the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel directs its efforts
almost exclusively toward Government bills and serves only the
political party in power, it follows that an overwhelmingly large
proportion of the bills drafted by that Office are successful and a
correspondingly small proportion are unsuccessful. In contrast, it
seems safe to say that the greater part of the Washington draftsman's efforts are ultimately unproductive.
A third, though less important, explanation is that many
subordinate legislative matters that in Washington are handled as
straight legislation have in London been turned over to the
executive agencies to be handled principally as administrative
regulations, with an assent or acquiescence from Parliament.
Because of the constitutional separation of powers in the United
States, there is an important distinction between legislation enacted
by Congress and that in effect enacted by executive agencies in the
form of administrative regulations. Constitutionally, Congress is
supposed to be incapable of abdicating its legislative functions, and
the kind of legislative function that has in fact been delegated to
the individual executive agencies has been legitimated by accompanying the authorisation with general statutory guides or by confining it in closely restricted channels. As a result, the scope of the
4

i.e., " the Administration," in Washington terminology.
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regulatory activities of United States executive agencies has been
more modest than in England. However, within the areas within
which these agencies have been allowed to operate, they have for
the most part been allowed to act without further Congressional
participation, except that inherent in reporting and publication
requirements and in Congress's general appropriation and investigatory powers.
Compare the role of " delegated " or " subordinate " legislation
in England. Free of such constitutional inhibitions, Parliament has
seen fit to delegate a significant part of the overall legislative job to
the executive agencies, and in each case the authority of the particular agency is measured wholly by the charter granted by the
parent statute relating to the subject-matter in question. While
broadening Parliament's legislative reach, as well as that of the
Office of Parliamentary Counsel, it has put a relatively larger
burden on the executive agencies.
Delegated legislation is of three major kinds, depending upon
the degree of control retained by Parliament. Although once Congress has delegated legislative authority it ordinarily retains no
direct string on it, the same is not true in England, where general
guide lines for parliamentary participation are found in the
Statutory Instruments Act, 1946. In the usual situation, the
parent statute provides that the regulations issued will stay in
effect unless either House carries a resolution against it within forty
sitting days.'
The closest analogue in the United States is the
reorganisation plan effectuated under the Reorganization Act of
1949. A second type is the regulation that becomes effective only
if approved by a resolution of each House. This is much less common, and its usefulness as delegated legislation lies in the fact that
although parliamentary action is required the burden of preparation
and development rests on the particular agency and the result (as
with the first type) must be taken whole or rejected whole. Such a
regulation is not subject to committee action and it may not be
amended on the floor. In fact, even the most controversial regulations can get an affirmative resolution in one parliamentary day.
The third important type, which corresponds most closely to regulations in the American sense, is that to which no string is attached.
Although in volume this kind of regulation looms large, it is confined to matters of comparative triviality.
Besides these three major kinds of delegated legislation, there is
a fourth, but very exceptional, type. This is used in cases in which
3 Some instruments must be submitted to Parliament in draft and do not become
effective until the 40 sitting days have elapsed. See s. 6 (1) of the Statutory
Instruments Act, 1946.
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emergency action is necessary, or in those in which it is desirable
to prevent forestalling, but the importance of the subject-matter
demands affirmative resolution (e.g., orders imposing customs
action). Here the parent statute provides that the regulations
authorised will be effective for four weeks only, unless they are
affirmatively approved by both Houses.
Because (I suspect) a significant number of regulations of types
one and two correspond to what would normally be enacted as law
by Congress," a comparison of drafting methods should probably
include a description of how those are drafted in England. On this,
a brief word later.
One field, not now very important, lies well outside the range of
legislation and regulation already discussed: legislative matters
falling within the royal prerogative. The most important area here
is the military, as to which the Crown retains a number of powers.
With respect to these the Crown may legislate in the Queen's name,
usually in the form of orders and sometimes in the form of regulations, but always without needing an enabling act of Parliament or
its later approval or acquiescence. Parliament could, of course,
step in and take charge of this area at any time.
So much for the general context in which legislation is prepared.
What about the draftsmen and their methods?
The Office of Parliamentary Counsel dates from 1869. Before
that time, much of England's legislation was drafted in the Temple
by persons with little or no experience. The Treasury, in the exercise of its management (as distinct from money) functions, which
correspond to those exercised by Washington's Bureau of the
Budget, established the Office and manned it with the Home
Office's draftsman, Lord Thring, and an assistant. These two
lawyers became the draftsmen of the great bulk of government
legislation. In any period this would be no mean feat. In a day
before typewriters and shorthand it must have been extraordinary.
Although the Treasury remains the nominal sponsor of the Office
of the Parliamentary Counsel, in practice the Office works in closer
liaison with the cabinet office. But, unlike the Offices of the Legislative Counsel of the House and Senate in Washington, it remains
the servant of the executive branch rather than the legislative.
The present staff consists of a First Parliamentary Counsel, a
Second Parliamentary Counsel, five undesignated Parliamentary
Counsel, and ten Assistant Parliamentary Counsel. This total of
seventeen draftsmen compares with eleven for the Office of the
a This suspicion is based on a comparison of the English and American military
laws. However, Henry P. Rowe writes that he doubts that it has yet been
verified generally.
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Legislative Counsel of the Senate and ten for that of the House of
Representatives.
The First Parliamentary Counsel assigns the work, but beyond
that he does a minimum of office administration, devoting as much
time as he can to drafting. The six other Parliamentary Counsel,
once they have received their assignments, work independently and
autonomously, except that each has the services of one of the
Assistant Counsel, who rotate under a system of approximately
one-year assignments. On most bills, therefore, the lawyers work
in pairs, and it is only in the case of a relatively few of the less
important bills that either works solo. This in general corresponds
to the " buddy system " used in some of the states of the United
States. The fact is significant because it confirms what many
believe to be an essential characteristic of drafting-the team
approach. The individual Parliamentary Counsel concerned remains
solely responsible for the result, but he has the benefit of the cross
checking and counter-balancing of his Assistant. In this respect,
the Offices of Legislative Counsel of the Senate and the House differ
in that their draftsmen tend to work more on an individual basis,
except as circumstances and complications suggest the desirability
of consultation and cross checking, or of a team approach, which
is usually the case with the more important bills.
With a partial exception for finance bills, there is no specialisation according to subject-matter. The positive reason is that the
Office must move quickly and work is speeded by assigning bills
according to workload rather than by subject-matter. The negative
reason is that specialisation is unnecessary because it is believed
that the draftsman's main function is to know the questions rather
than the answers. For the facts he can, like his Washington
counterpart, go to an expert and ask questions; for the law, he does
much of his own research, but in discharging his responsibility he
leans heavily on the departmental lawyers familiar with the
the particular subject-matter. In this way a good draftsman can
turn out a professional result without previously being an expert
in the particular field. (This approach rejects the view that the
best person to draft a statute is the lawyer who in the first instance
is the most familiar with the specific subject-matter.)
Work on a bill is not undertaken casually. Only the departments can initiate legislation draftable by the Office of the
Parliamentary Counsel, and this can be done only through the
minister concerned and with the approval of his fellow ministers.
This consists of getting the approval of (1) the appropriate policy
committees of the cabinet and (2) the programming committee.

The Cambridge Law Journal

[1959]

The minute of the programming committee constitutes the departmental credential for the proposed bill. This is subject to the
usually pro forma approval by the Treasury, a carry-over from the
time when there was no adequate programming committee. The
final step is for the legal adviser to the department concerned to
prepare departmental instructions, addressed to the Parliamentary
Counsel and specifying in particular what the proposed legislation
is intended to embody. A good departmental instruction will be
comprehensive and will frequently refer to relevant statutes and
court cases. The Parliamentary Counsel discourages instruments
couched in the form of proposed statutes on the ground that the
inexperienced authors of such attempts usually succeed in obscuring
their specific objectives instead of being helpful to the draftsman.
The system just described is further reason for the greater
productivity of London draftsmen and it is in refreshing contrast to
the slipshod habits in Washington, where even the sophisticated
draftsmen of the Senate and House have not adequately coped with
the prevalent tendency to rush into " legal language " each tentative expression of uncrystallised policy.
In Washington the Congressional committee practice of considering only full-blown bills, a very large proportion of which
originate in the executive agencies as expressions of proposed (and
thus tentative) policy, means that much of the initial drafting work
must later be redone. With executiv6 powers constitutionally
separated from legislative powers, this is unavoidable. Moreover,
a committee's policy changes are usually reflected in concurrent
drafting changes made under conditions that handicap even the
expert draftsman. Finally, once a committee has concluded its
policy deliberations, the bill's sponsors are strongly tempted to
push for immediate floor consideration. Meanwhile, any thoroughgoing attempt to solve the remaining drafting problems is likely to
stumble over the belief that the committee's policy decisions have
somehow sanctified the specific wording in which those decisions
happened, in the confinement of formal deliberation, to have been
expressed. As a result, what started out as an adequately drafted
bill may end up as crude patchwork.
Some of this could be avoided if Congressional committees ceased
definitive redrafting as they changed policy and, especially, if they
took fuller account of the fact that, although it is comparatively
easy to change the plan of a building at the blueprint stage, it is
hard to change it once the building is largely completed. Thus,
they might well concentrate more on substantive policy and leave
the perfecting language changes to their draftsmen, to be carried
out uninhibited by the exigencies of formal committee deliberation.
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In the composition of statutes, the Office of the Parliamentary
Counsel exercises a high degree of independence and the client
makes little attempt to intrude into matters of technique and form.
Suggestions relating to these matters are politely received, but the
Office exercises its own best judgment. At the same time the draftsmen are sophisticated enough to recognise situations in which
important political considerations require concessions in form and
approach. In this respect there appears to be no significant
difference in the initial drafting of bills between the Office of the
Parliamentary Counsel and the Offices of the Legislative Counsel of
the House and Senate. However, after the bill reaches the committee stage, where in Washington significant changes are more
likely to be made, the draftsman has less of a free hand.
One matter of Parliamentary procedure, incidentally, has had a
mild effect on the form that extended bills would otherwise take.
The Committees' practice of approving bills section-by-section,
beginning at the beginning, has affected the arrangement of bills
by causing (1) the introductory sections to be limited to general
principles, with detailed qualifications deferred for development in
later sections, and (2) the definitions to be placed at the end,
instead of at the beginning, as is usually done in American bills.
Although the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel remains an
arm of the executive branch for the purpose of serving that branch,
it frequently advises the clerks of the standing committees on the
supposed meaning of amendments proposed to be made in bills
already introduced and under consideration by Parliament.
Although in this role the draftsman acts as independent adviser on
the bill, he is in a relationship of complete trust with the clerk,
who is not a lawyer. His advice is frank and it includes technical
matters, such as points of order, that in Washington would be
handled by the Parliamentarian (Parliament has no such officer).
It is interesting also to compare the handling of what are known
in the United States as " codification " bills and in England as
" consolidation " bills, that is, unified restatements of existing
statutory law. In Washington, codification bills are prepared
under the sponsorship of the Law Revision Subcommittee of the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. In
most instances they are farmed out to particular executive agencies
or to private publishing concerns, and when introduced they have a
standing no different from that of any other kind of bill. In
England, all consolidation bills are prepared by a consolidation
branch set up within the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel and
consisting, at the present time, of three lawyers, two of whom are
drawn on an approximately two-year rotating basis from the
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personnel of the Office as a whole. The third lawyer is permanently
assigned to this work. The separate branch was set up in 1947
to keep the non-consolidation bills from pre-empting the field.
Consolidation bills are immune from substantive amendment,
because under Parliament's rules of relevance such an amendment
is not germane to the subject matter of a bill whose only object is
to restate existing law. The Consolidation of Enactments (Procedure) Act, 1949, extends this immunity to consolidation bills that
contain some small departures from the substance of existing law,
provided the departure is not substantial. Thus, standardisation
of minor aspects of procedure does not take such a bill out of the
protected class.
A closely related kind of bill is the bill " To consolidate with
amendments. . .

."

This approach is used in those cases where

the text of existing law is badly cluttered with inconsistencies and
irrationalities resulting from successive layers of legislation.
Briefly, it consists of a start-from-scratch attempt to restate what
is believed to be the substance of existing law, without attempting
to account for each provision of current text. Such bills normally
contain some substantive changes. Not enjoying a privileged
status, they are subject to amendment like any other bill. Recent
examples include the Customs and Excise Act, 1952, and the Army
Act, 1955.
Delegated (or " subordinate ") legislation, on the other hand,
is normally drafted by government lawyers assigned to the agency
concerned. (Only that of exceptional importance is drafted by the
Office of the Parliamentary Counsel.) In the Ministry of Transport
and Civil Aviation, for example, delegated legislation is handled by
the Principal Legal Adviser and a staff of seven lawyers who,
though they are employed by the Treasury, are assigned to serve
the legal needs of the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation.
The problem of diversity is minimised (1) by the small size of the
total legal staff, all of whom spend a considerable part of their time
drafting, and (2) by the fact that all important regulations clear
through one person, the Principal Legal Adviser, who in the case
of the current incumbent happens to be a graduate of the Office of
the Parliamentary Counsel.
The significant differences between legislative drafting in London
and that in Washington do not lie in any differences between the
methods and skills of the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel and
those of the Offices of the Legislative Counsel of the House and
Senate, for which the similarities are more striking than the
differences. They lie, instead, in the fact that in Washington
proposed legislation is much more vulnerable to redrafting, under

C.L.J.

Legislative Drafting in London and Washington

57

conditions that are not always favourable to the practice of the
drafting art, and in the fact that the greater bulk of legislative drafting is done outside those Offices and in many instances by persons of
more modest experience and skill. Whereas in London the typical
bill is drafted by a full-time professional, in Washington it is drafted
by an inexperienced lawyer, a heterogeneous ad hoc committee, or a
partly experienced lawyer whose drafting duties are a mere incident
to his other duties. Contributing to this situation is the popular
assumption that a law school diploma carries with it full competence to draft any legal document, including the most complicated
and sensitive legislation. That this assumption has not been
supported by the results does not appear to have caused widespread
concern.
Equally important is the fact that in Washington legislative
drafting is done by a far larger number of draftsmen. Even among
draftsmen of uniform ability the dissipation of the general chore
of drafting legislation among a large number of lawyer groups
reflecting different governmental attitudes and approaches, some of
whom are subject to rapid turnover, is inevitably reflected in the
legislative results. Certainly the most fertile single source of confused, difficult-to-read, overlapping, and conflicting statutes is the
lack of uniformity in approach, terminology, and style. The
ravages of heterogeneous authorship appear to be large in Washington and small in London. Nor is there a presently available solution
in Washington, in the absence of any effective screening of legislation generally.
Such screening is not provided by any agency of Congress, except with respect to " codification " (consolidation) bills, all of which
funnel through the House Judiciary Committee. Nor is it provided
by the executive branch except as a particular agency may achieve
a degree of uniformity with respect to specific statutes within its
own limited orbit. Viewed broadly, the Tower-of-Babel problem
is much greater in Washington than it is in London and it has been
dealt with less successfully. Unless there is a major reorganisation
of the Congressional drafting services, the only effective control of
uniformity problems rests with individual executive agencies (which
initiate the bulk of the legislation that affects their operations),
working in close conjunction with the appropriate committee staffs.
In the smaller agencies, with their smaller legal staffs, the problem
of heterogeneous authorship may not appear to be marked, but in
such sizeable agencies as the Department of Defense it remains a
significant and baffling problem.

